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Abstract
A distributed computing protocol consists of three components: (i) Data Localization: a network-
wide dataset is decomposed into local datasets separately preserved at a network of nodes; (ii) Node
Communication: the nodes hold individual dynamical states and communicate with the neighbors about
these dynamical states; (iii) Local Computation: state recursions are computed at each individual node.
Information about the local datasets enters the computation process through the node-to-node com-
munication and the local computations, which may be leaked to dynamics eavesdroppers having access
to global or local node states. In this paper, we systematically investigate this potential computational
privacy risks in distributed computing protocols in the form of structured system identification, and
then propose and thoroughly analyze a Privacy-Preserving-Summation-Consistent (PPSC) mechanism
as a generic privacy encryption subroutine for consensus-based distributed computations. The central
idea is that the consensus manifold is where we can both hide node privacy and achieve computational
accuracy. In this first part of the paper, we demonstrate the computational privacy risks in distributed
algorithms against dynamics eavesdroppers and particularly in distributed linear equation solvers, and
then propose the PPSC mechanism and illustrate its usefulness.
1 Introduction
The development of distributed control and optimization has become one of the central streams in the study
of complex network operations, due to the rapidly growing volume and dimension of data and information
flow from a variety of applications such as social networking, smart grid, and intelligent transportation [3].
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Celebrated results have been established for problems ranging from optimization [4, 5] and learning [6]
to formation [7] and localization [8], where distributed control and decision-making solutions provide
resilience and scalability for large-scale problems through allocating information sensing and decision
making over individual agents. The origin of this line of research can be traced back to the 1980s from
the work of distributed optimization and decision making [9] and parallel computations [10]. Consensus
algorithms serve as a basic tool for the information dissemination of distributed algorithms [11,12], where
the goal is to drive the node states of a network to a common value related to the network initials by node
interactions respecting the network structure, usually just the average.
The primary power of consensus algorithms lies in their distributed nature in the sense that throughout
the recursions of the algorithms, individual nodes only share their state information with a few other nodes
that are connected to or trusted which are called neighbors. As a result, building on consensus algorithms,
many algorithms can be designed which utilize the consensus mechanism to achieve network-level control
and computation objectives, e.g., the recent work on network linear equation solvers [13, 14], and convex
optimization of a sum of local objective functions [5]. This emerging progress on distributed computation
is certainly an extension of the classical development of distributed and parallel computation, but the
new emphasis is on how a distributed computing algorithm for a network-wide problem can be designed
with robustness and resilience over a given communication structure [13, 14], instead of breaking down a
high-dimensional system to a number of computing units with all-to-all communications.
Under a distributed computing structure, the information about the network-wide computation problem
is encoded in the individual node initial values or update rules, which are not shared directly among the
nodes. Rather, nodes share certain dynamical states based on neighboring communications and local
problem datasets, in order to find solutions of the global problem. The node dynamical states may contain
sensitive private information directly or indirectly, but in distributed computations to achieve the network-
wide computation goals nodes have to accept the fact that their privacy, or at least some of it, will
be inevitably lost. It was pointed out that indeed nodes lose their privacy in terms of initial values if
an attacker, a malicious user, or an eavesdropper knows part of the node trajectories and the network
structure [17, 18]. In fact, as long as observability holds, the whole network initial values become re-
constructable with only a segment of node state updates at a few selected nodes. Several insightful privacy-
preserving consensus algorithms have been presented in the literature [19–23] in the past few years, where
the central idea is to inject random noise or offsets in the node communication and iterations, or employ
local maps as node state masks. The classical notion on differential privacy in computer science has also
been introduced to distributed optimization problems [34, 35], following the earlier work on differentially
private filtering [36].
In this paper, we systematically investigate the potential computational privacy risks in distributed com-
puting protocols, and then propose and thoroughly analyze a Privacy-Preserving-Summation-Consistent
(PPSC) mechanism as a generic privacy encryption step for consensus-based distributed computations.
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In distributed computing protocols, a network-wide dataset is decomposed into local datasets which are
separately located at a network of nodes; the nodes hold individual dynamical states, based on which
communication packets are produced and shared according to the network structure; local computations
are then carried out at each individual node. The information about the local datasets enters the com-
putation process through the node-to-node communication or the local computations; while techniques
from system identification may be able to recover such datasets by observations of the node states. In
this first part of the paper, we reveal the identification-type computational risk in distributed algorithms
and particularly in distributed linear equation solvers, and then define a so-called PPSC mechanism for
privacy preservation. The main results of the paper are summarized as follows.
• We show that distributed computing is exposed to privacy risks in terms the local datasets from both
global and local eavesdroppers having access to the entirety or part of the node states. Particularly,
for network linear equations as a basic computation task, we show explicitly how the computational
privacy has indeed been completely lost to global eavesdroppers for almost all initial values, and
partially to local passive or active eavesdroppers who can monitor or alter selected node states.
• We propose a Privacy-Preserving-Summation-Consistent (PPSC) mechanism which is shown to be
useful as a generic privacy encryption step for consensus-based distributed computations. The central
idea is to make use of the consensus manifold to on one hand hide node privacy, and on the other
hand ensure computation accuracy and efficiency.
We remark that the existence of lower-dimensional manifold for the network-wide computation goal is
very much not unique only for consensus-based distributed computing, and therefore the idea of the
PPSC mechanism may be extended to other distributed computing methods. In the second part of the
paper, we demonstrate that PPSC mechanism can be realized by conventional gossip algorithms, and
establish their detailed privacy-preserving capabilities and convergence efficiencies.
Some preliminary ideas and results of this work were presented at IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control in Dec. 2018 [1, 2]. In the current manuscript, we have established a series of new results on
privacy loss characterizations and privacy preservation quantifications, in addition to a few new illustration
examples and technical proofs.
The remainder the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a general model for dis-
tributed computing protocols, based on which we define the resulting computational privacy. The con-
nection between computational privacy and network structure and initial-value privacies is also discussed.
In Section 3, we investigate the potential loss of computational privacies in distributed computing algo-
rithms, and in particular in distributed linear equation solvers. We also show that conventional methods
for differential privacy often lead to non-ideal computation result for distributed computings facing funda-
mental privacy vs. accuracy trade-off in differential privacy can be challenging for a recursive computing
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process. In Section 4, we define the PPSC mechanism and illustrate how we can design privacy-preserving
algorithms for average consensus, distributed linear equation solvers, and in general for distributed convex
optimization based on PPSC mechanism. Section 5 extends the discussion on computational privacy loss
to local eavesdroppers and establish some results using classical system identification methods. Finally
Section 6 concludes the paper with a few remarks. The various statements established in this paper is
collected in the appendix.
Notation. We let Hij ,Hi denote the ij–th entry and the transpose of the i–th row of a matrix H,
respectively. For a vector v, [v]i denotes its i–th component. Let diag(a1, . . . , an) with ai ∈ R denote a
diagonal matrix with diagonal entries being a1, . . . , an in order. The transpose of a matrix or a vector H
are denoted by H>. Let tr(·) denote the trace of a square matrix. The orthogonal complement of a vector
space S is denoted by S⊥. Let ⊗ denote the Kronecker product of two matrices or the direct sum of two
sets. Conventionally, ‖·‖p is the p–norm of a vector or a matrix, and ‖·‖ is its 2–norm. Let λm(·), λM(·) be
the smallest and the largest eigenvalue of a real symmetric matrix. Let σM(·), σm(·) denote the maximum
and minimum absolute value of eigenvalues of a real symmetric matrix. Let ‖ · ‖F denote the Frobenius
norm of a matrix. The range of a matrix or a function is denoted as range(·). We use Z,Z≥0,Z+,R,R+
to represent the set of integers, the set of nonnegative integers, the set of positive integers, the set of
real numbers, and the set of positive real numbers, respectively. We let Pr(·) be the probability of an
event in some probability space. We let pdf(·),E(·) denote the probability density function (PDF) and the
expected value of a random variable, respectively. Let Lap(v) with v > 0 denote the zero–mean Laplace
distribution with variance 2v2. Correspondingly, Lapn(v) represents an n–dimensional vector of identical
and independent random variables distributed according to Lap(v).
2 Privacy Notions in Distributed Computation
In this section, we first introduce a basic model for distributed computation protocols which clearly
indicates the problem decomposition, node communication, and node state update along the recursions.
Next, we discuss potential eavesdroppers for distributed computing protocols and the resulting categories
of privacy losses at both network and individual node levels.
2.1 Distributed Computations
Consider a network of n nodes indexed in V = {1, . . . , n} whose communication structure is described by
a graph G = (V,E). We assume G is an undirected connected graph for the sake of having a simplified
presentation. Let D be a dataset whose elements are embedded in different dimensional Euclidean spaces.
We write D = D ′ if D and D ′ have identical records (up to some equivalence relation). Suppose D is
allocated over the network by partition D = D1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Dn, where node i holds Di and ⊗ represents
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direct sum to indicate potential logical or computational structure of the data points D. Each node holds
a dynamical sate xi(t) ∈ Rm. Let Ni =
{
j : {i, j} ∈ E} be the neighbor set of node i. The following
protocol describes a general procedure for distributed computing algorithms.
DCP Distributed Computing Protocols
1: Set t← 0 and xi(0) ∈ Rm for i ∈ V.
2: Each node i computes ci(t) = li,t
(
xi(t),Di
)
and sends ci(t) to all its neighbors j ∈ Ni.
3: Each node i updates their states xi(t+ 1)← fi,t
(
xi(t); cj(t), j ∈ Ni; Di
)
.
4: Set t← t+ 1 and go to Step 2.
The ci(t) are the intermediate quantities for communications among the nodes, which often coincide
with the nodes states xi(t). The mappings li,t and fi,t can be deterministic or random, and they are
distributed in the sense that they are mappings of the local data Di and information received from
neighbors. The closed-loop of the above distributed computing protocol is described by
xi(t+ 1) = fi,t
(
xi(t); lj,t
(
xj(t),Dj
)
, j ∈ Ni; Di
)
. (1)
In the following, we present a few examples in the literature showing how this DCP model covers average
consensus and consensus-based distributed computing algorithms. To this end, let W = [wij ] be a doubly
stochastic matrix in Rn×n that complies with the graph G, i.e., wij > 0 if and only if j ∈ Ni over the
graph G for i 6= j. In particular, we assume wii > 0 for all i ∈ Ni.
2.1.1 Average Consensus
Each node i is assigned Di = βi ∈ R. The initial state xi(0) is set as βi. The mapping li,t is identity, and
therefore ci(t) = xi(t). Then
xi(t+ 1) = fi,t
(
xi(t); cj(t), j ∈ Ni; Di
)
=
∑
j∈Ni
⋃{i}wijxj(t) (2)
represents a standard average consensus algorithm.
2.1.2 Distributed Linear Equations
Each node i holds Di = (Hi, zi) with Hi ∈ Rm and zi ∈ R defining a linear equation
Ei : H
>
i y = zi (3)
with respect to an unknown y ∈ Rm. The overall dataset D forms the following linear algebraic equation
E : Hy = z (4)
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with H ∈ Rn×m, z ∈ Rn, where H>i is the i-th row of H and zi denotes the i-th component of z. Let
Pi : Rm → Rm be the orthogonal projection onto the subspace
{
y ∈ Rm : H>i y = zi
}
, which encodes the
information of Di. The following two algorithms are common distributed linear equation solvers.
• [Consensus+Projection Algorithm (CPA)] Let ci(t) = xi(t). The following algorithm is an Euler
approximation of the so–called “consensus + projection” flow [13–15]:
xi(t+ 1) = fi,t
(
xi(t); cj(t), j ∈ Ni; Di
)
=
∑
j∈Ni
⋃{i}wijxj(t) + α
(
Pi
(
xi(t)
)− xi(t)), (5)
where α > 0 is a step-size parameter.
• [Projection Consensus Algorithm (PCA)] Let ci(t) = Pi
(
xi(t)
)
. We can also have the following
algorithm as a distributed linear equation solver [5, 16]:
xi(t+ 1) = fi,t
(
xi(t); cj(t), j ∈ Ni; Di
)
=
∑
j∈Ni
⋃{i}wijPj
(
xj(t)
)
. (6)
2.1.3 Distributed Convex Optimization
Each node holds Di being a differentiable convex function fi : Rm → R. The overall dataset D =
n∑
i=1
fi(·).
Again ci(t) = xi(t), and the node update is given by [4]
xi(t+ 1) = fi,t
(
xi(t); cj(t), j ∈ Ni; Di
)
=
∑
j∈Ni
⋃{i}wijxj(t)− t∇fi(xi(t)), (7)
which describes a distributed gradient descent algorithm.
2.2 Communication and Dynamics Eavesdroppers
In practice, there can be two typical types of malicious eavesdroppers for a distributed computing process.
Communication eavesdroppers are adversaries who can intercept node-to-node communications, i.e., the
ci(t). Dynamics eavesdroppers are adversaries who can monitor the node dynamical states xi(t). For the
choice of the communication mechanism
ci(t) = li,t
(
xi(t),Di
)
,
we can see that eavesdroppers that have access to both the node states and node communications may
easily identify Di to the extent that ci(t) depends on the data Di. For the two categories of eavesdroppers,
they can also have distinct capabilities.
(i) Eavesdroppers may have different knowledge about the network, e.g., knowledge of the number of
nodes, network structure, and mechanisms of the communication and node updates.
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(ii) Eavesdroppers can be local or global in the sense that they are able to monitor the communication
or node states of the entire network or only at one or a few nodes.
(iii) Eavesdroppers can be active or passive by whether they are able to or willing to influence the
observed data. E.g., a passive communication eavesdropper records ci(t) at a node i only, while an
active eavesdropper might aim to replace ci(t) with some injected data.
In this paper, we focus on dynamics eavesdroppers, motivated by applications of distributed computing
where the node dynamical states xi(t) might represent physical quantities, e.g. the powers and voltages
of generators in a smart grid, the velocities and accelerations of trucks in a platoon, and the workloads
of computing servers in a cloud. Such physical quantities might be potentially measurable by malicious
sensors. We limit our discussion on the effect of communication eavesdroppers because on the one hand,
existing cryptography methods have the capacity to enable secure node-to-node communication; and
on the other hand, communication eavesdroppers fall to the category of dynamics eavesdroppers when
ci(t) = xi(t), which holds true for many existing distributed computing algorithms.
2.3 Privacy Notions and Related Works
There can be various notions of privacies in a dynamical network process. First of all, the node dynamics
reveal information about the network itself. As a result, dynamics eavesdroppers may infer statistics or even
the topology of the network. This type of study has been investigated in the context network tomography
and network identification problems [27–30]. Furthermore, for an individual node i, its dynamical state
xi(t), and especially its initial value xi(0) may directly contain sensitive information. We present the
following illustrative example.
Example 1. Let i represent an individual in a company of in an organization. Let βi ∈ R be the monthly
salary of the individual i. For each month, the individuals can run the average consensus algorithm (2)
with xi(0) = βi, and as t tends to infinity, each node will be able to learn the value of
∑n
j=1 βj/n. Along
this computation process (2), it has been shown that with observability condition and knowledge about
the weight matrix W, it is possible to recover x(0) from observation of a finite trajectory at a single node
i [18]. On the other hand, the network structure G may be re-constructible by a node knockout process
established in [27]. Additionally, in this process, node i reveal its states to its neighbors, which means that
it loses its privacy with respect to βi to neighbors right at the first step.
In this paper, we are primarily interested in the privacy issues defined by the local datasets Di against
dynamics eavesdroppers. These local datasets Di may be sensitive in terms of privacy in general dynamical
networks, e.g., the local cost functions in distributed economical MPC directly reflects the economy of
individual subsystems [24]. We aim to establish concrete results on the possibilities of identifying the
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local datasets Di in distributed computing schemes. This problem is precisely a parameter identification
problem in classical system identification literature [25,26], but with specific dynamics structure inherited
from the network topology and problem setup. We term this type of privacy as computational privacy
in a distributed computing protocol, and use distributed solvers for network linear equations as a basic
example to illustrate the computational privacy loss.
3 Dynamical Privacy and PPSC Mechanism
In this section, we define and specify computational risks in a distributed computing protocol, subject to
either global or local eavesdroppers of node dynamical states.
3.1 Dynamics Eavesdroppers
We introduce the following definition.
Definition 1. For a distributed computing protocol (1), a global dynamics eavesdropper is a party who has
access to the node states
(
x(t)
)∞
t=0
with initial condition x(0) = x0. For global dynamics eavesdroppers, the
distributed computing protocol (1) is computationally private with respect to the dataset D under initial
condition x0 ∈ Rnm if the dataset D is not recoverable from
(
x(t)
)∞
t=0
.
A distributed computing protocol (1) induces a mechanism M which maps from the space of the data
D to the space of the trajectories
(
x(t)
)∞
t=0
, by
Mx0(D) =
(
x(t)
)∞
t=0
.
The following statement provides a generic condition for computational privacy.
Proposition 1. For the distributed computing protocol (1), the following statements hold.
(i) With deterministic update, the distributed computing protocol (1) is globally computationally private
with respect to the dataset D under initial condition x0 ∈ Rnm if and only if there exists D ′ 6= D such
that Mx0(D) =Mx0(D ′).
(ii) With randomized update, the distributed computing protocol (1) is globally computationally private
under initial condition x0 ∈ Rnm with respect to the dataset D, if and only if there exists D ′ 6= D such
that pdf
(
Mx0(D)
)
= pdf
(
Mx0(D ′)
)
.
In the following, we show some more explicit characterizations of the computational privacy in network
linear equation solvers. Let E = {a>y = b : a ∈ Rm, b ∈ R} be the space of linear equations over Rm, and
then let E ∗[nm] =
{
Ay = b : A ∈ Rn×m,b ∈ Rn, b ∈ range(A)} be the space of the solvable n–dimensional
linear equations over Rm.
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Definition 2. (i) Let E : a>y = b and E′ : a′>y = b′ be two equations in E . We term that E and E′ are
equivalent if there exists α ∈ R \ {0} such that a′ = αa, b′ = αb.
(ii) Let E : Ay = b and E′ : A′y = b′ be two equations in E ∗[nm]. We say that E and E
′ are equivalent
if there exist α1, . . . , αn ∈ R \ {0} such that A′ = diag(α1, . . . , αn)A, b′ = diag(α1, . . . , αn)b.
It is worth mentioning that equipped with the equivalence relation in Definition 2, each equation
E ∈ E ∗[nm] corresponds to a unique equivalence class: {E′ ∈ E ∗[nm] : E′ ∼ E}. This further specifies the
quotient space E ∗[nm]/ ∼:=
{{E′ ∈ E ∗[nm] : E′ ∼ E} : E ∈ E ∗[nm]}. It can be easily verified that the linear
equations in the same equivalence class share a common solution set. Therefore, with Definition 2, we
have effectively identified the information of a solvable linear equation with its solution set for equations
in E ∗[nm]. For the two distributed linear equation solvers in (5) and (6), we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Consider a linear equation E ∈ E ∗[nm]. Assume that the weight matrix W is public knowledge.
(i) Suppose α is also public knowledge. The CPA (5) is not computationally private in the quotient
space E ∗[nm]/ ∼ against global dynamics eavesdroppers for E under almost all initial conditions.
(ii) The PCA (6) is not computationally private in the quotient space E ∗[nm]/ ∼ against global dynamics
eavesdroppers for E under almost all initial conditions.
The following example illustrates how the information about the linear equation has been lost during the
recursion of a distributed linear equation solver, which partially explains the intuition behind Theorem 1.
Example 2. Consider a 4–node star graph centered at node 1 and the following linear equation:
E :

3 −1
1.5 0.8
−2 1.5
−1.2 4
y =

5
−0.1
−5
−9.2
 .
Let the CPA (5) with α = 0.1 and
W =

0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4
0.3 0.7 0 0
0.2 0 0.8 0
0.4 0 0 0.6

starting from some initial condition be implemented.
A geometric illustration of the way that a global dynamics eavesdropper reconstructs E is shown in
Figure 1. In Figure 1 (a), the states xi(t), t = 0, 1, . . . , 10 of nodes i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are plotted by the dot points
of different colors. Then the projections Pi
(
xi(t)
)
, t = 0, 1, . . . , 9 for all i are computed by the eavesdropper
according to (5), as marked by the stars in Figure 1 (b). By Pi
(
xi(t)
)
and the perpendicularity of the
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(a) Node trajectories (b) Projection computation
(c) Equation reconstruction
Figure 1: (a) shows the trajectories of the node states xi(t) with t = 0, 1, . . . , 10 and i = 1, 2, 3, 4. (b)
demonstrates the computed projection points Pi
(
xi(t)
)
, t = 0, 1, . . . , 9 by eavesdroppers. (c) illustrates the
disclosed solution affine space of the linear equations.
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projections, the solution spaces of E′is are identified as shown in Figure 1 (c). As a result, an equivalent
set {E′ : E′ ∼ E} has been reconstructed by the eavesdropper.
3.2 Differentiallly Private Computation
From the above investigation of distributed linear equation solvers, we now have a concrete example
where the local datasets for a distributed computation setup may indeed be lost during the computation
process. We acknowledge that information nodes have to reveal certain amount of information about the
local datasets Di in the overall closed-loop dynamical equation (1): If absolutely no information about
Di enters (1), the eventual computation outcome will not depend on Di and therefore will never be a
network-wide solution. It has been shown how we can borrow the idea of differential privacy in distributed
optimization problems, e.g., [34, 35], following the earlier work on differentially private filtering [36].
3.2.1 Differentiallly Private Distributed Computation
Differential privacy is a concept that statistically quantifies the ability of an information protocol to protect
the privacy of confidential databases, and meanwhile provide as accurate query output as possible. It was
formally proposed in [33], with the intuition being that a query that comes from a database is nearly
indistinguishable even if a record in the database is modified or removed. Recall that the dataset D is
allocated over the network by partition D = D1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Dn. We say D ′ = D ′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗D ′n is adjacent with
D if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Dj = D ′j , ∀j 6= i.
Recall that Mx0(·) is the mechanism along a randomized distributed computing protocol defined by
Mx0(D) =
(
x(t)
)∞
t=0
. We can then borrow conventional differential privacy notion to define thatMx0 is -
differentially private with some privacy budget  > 0 if for all adjacent D,D ′, and for all R ⊂ range(Mx0),
Pr(Mx0(D) ∈ R) ≤ e · Pr(Mx0(D ′) ∈ R),
where the probability is taken over the randomness used by Mx0 .
In the differential privacy literature [33], one popular approach is the so–called Laplace mechanism,
where Laplace noise with appropriate randomness is added to the output returned from the input data.
One can apply this approach to the distributed computing protocol (1) by simply viewing Mx0 as a data
processing mechanism and resolving differential privacy challenges with added noise [34, 35]. However,
adding noise to (1) will in general make it impossible for the protocol to converge to the true value,
and in many cases one can only establish error guarantee that is increasingly conservative as time moves
forward under rather restrictive conditions [34,35]. In contrast, classical differential privacy results manage
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to achieve differential privacy with tolerable errors that vanish with an inceasing dimension of the input
data [33]. The reason for this sharp comparison is that, the dimension of the outputs of Mx0 (i.e., the
x(t)) increases linearly with time steps, controlling the error the way how a standard differentially private
query system works becomes challenging or even impossible. In the following, we illustrate this point for
distributed LAE solvers.
3.2.2 Differentially Private Network LAE Solving
For network linear equations, we can define adjacency properties of different datasets over the quotient
space.
Definition 3. Consider two linear equations E : Ay = b, E′ : A′y = b′ ∈ E ∗[nm]. We call them to be
(δA, δb)–adjacent if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Ej ∼ E′j ,∀j 6= i and∥∥∥∥AiA>iA>i Ai − A
′
iA
′>
i
A′>i A
′
i
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δA, ∥∥∥∥ biAiA>i Ai − b
′
iA
′
i
A′>i A
′
i
∥∥∥∥ ≤ δb.
Definition 4. Consider a distributed solver for linear equations in the space E ∗[nm]. Let Mx0(·) be the
resulting mechanism with Mx0(E) =
(
x(t)
)∞
t=0
. Then the solver is called −differenially private under
(δA, δb)–adjacency if
Pr(Mx0(E) ∈ R) ≤ e · Pr(Mx0(E′) ∈ R),
for all (δA, δb)–adjacent linear equations E : Ay = b, E
′ : A′y = b′ ∈ E ∗[nm], for any initial condition
x(0) ∈ Rnm, and for all network state trajectories in range(Mx0).
We assume the network of nodes have prior knowledge about a linear equation E that one of its
solutions falls in a compact and convex set Ω ⊂ Rm. We define a projection PΩ : Rm → Rm with
PΩ(u) = inf
v∈Ω
‖v− u‖. By adapting the deterministic CPA (5), we now present the following algorithm as
a Laplace–mechanism–based differentially private distributed LAE solver, where Laplace noise Lapm(cφt)
with c > 0, 0 < φ < 1 is injected prior to node state broadcasting at each time t. Define α(t) = λψt with
λ > 0 and 0 < ψ < 1 as a time–varying step size. Following the idea of [34], we propose the following
differentially private distributed linear equation solver based on the Laplace approach.
DP–DLES Differentially Private Distributed Linear Equation Solver
1: Set t← 0 and x(0).
2: Each node i ∈ V computes x[i(t) = PΩ
(
xi(t)
)
.
3: Each node i ∈ V draws ωi(t) from the distribution Lapm(cφt).
4: Each node i ∈ V computes x]i(t)← x[i(t) + ωi(t) and propagates x]i(t) to all its neighbors j ∈ Ni.
5: Each node i ∈ V computes xi(t+ 1)←
∑
j∈Ni
Wijx
]
j(t) + α(t)
(
Pi
(
x[i(t)
)− x[i(t)).
6: Set t← t+ 1 and go to Step 2.
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We present the following results.
Theorem 2. Suppose W ∈ Rn×n has full rank. Let B = sup
v∈Ω
‖v‖. Then the DP–DLES preserves
−differenial privacy under (δA, δb)–adjacency if ψ < φ with
φ
φ− ψ ·
λ
c
·
√
nm(BδH + δz)
σm(W)
≤ . (8)
Note that  is the privacy budget which is expected to be a small number. As a result, for a fixed amount
of noise injected to the computation process represented by c and φ in Lapm(cφt), λ and ψ to be small
enough for (8) to hold. The values of λ and ψ, however, determine how much local data information Di is
used in the computation step through the Pi. Therefore, small λ and ψ means greater computation error
will take place. This reveals the privacy vs computation dilemma, which can be seen from the following
example.
Example 3. Consider the same linear equation, network structure and weight matrix W as Example
1. We let Ω be a ball centered at y∗ with radius one. We tune the parameters of DP–DLES such that
DP–DLES preserves (, 1, 1)–differential privacy with  = 2, 4, 6, 8. Corresponding to the parameter setup
for each , we independently execute DP–DLES from starting from initial states sampled from [−1, 1] at
random for 103 times, and plot the averaged
‖
4∑
i=1
xi(t)− y∗‖
in Figure 2. It is clear from the numerical result that when better differential privacy is achieved, worse
computational accruracy is recorded.
Figure 2: The plot of the averaged ‖∑4i=1 xi(t)− y∗‖ along DP–DLES with  = 2, 4, 6, 8.
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4 PPSC Mechanism
In view of the above discussions, we now see that on one hand, dynamical privacy indeed exists in dis-
tributed computing processes; and on the other hand, adding noise to the computational recursions im-
proves privacy but in the meantime jeopardizes the computation accuracy. Noticing the fact that in average
consensus and in consensus-based distributed computing algorithms, the consensus manifold is where the
network-wide solution lies in, for which the node states can stay by local interactions even in the presence
of additional random noise. In this section, we show that we can effectively use this observation to hide
node privacy, under a so-called PPSC mechanism.
4.1 Mechanism Definition
Definition 5. Let βi ∈ Rm be held by node i over the network G = (V,E). An algorithm running over
the network is called a distributed Privacy-Preserving-Summation-Consistent (PPSC) mechanism, which
produces output β] = (β]>1 . . . β
]>
n )> from the network input β = (β>1 . . . β>n )>, if the following conditions
hold:
(i) (Graph Compliance) Each node i communicates only with its neighbors in the set Ni;
(ii) (Local Privacy Preservation) Each node i never reveals its initial value βi to any other agents or a
third party;
(iii) (Global Privacy Preservation) β is non-identifiable given β] with even an infinite number of inde-
pendent samples;
(iv) (Summation Consistency)
n∑
i=1
β]i =
n∑
i=1
βi.
The condition (i) requires that the information flow of the algorithm must comply with the underlying
graph; the condition (ii) says that during running of the algorithm no node will have to directly reveal its
initial value βi; the condition (iii) further suggests that even if final node states are known, it should not
be possible to use that knowledge to recover βi; the condition (iv) asks for that sum of the output of the
algorithm should be consistent with that of the input. The overall mechanism of PPSC is denoted as the
following mapping:
β] =P(β). (9)
4.2 PPSC for Distributed Computation
Now we show that the PPSC mechanism can be used as a privacy preservation step for distributed
computing algorithms.
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[Average Consensus] For the average consensus algorithm (2), we can run a distributed PPSC algo-
rithm over (β1, . . . , βn) and generate (β
]
1, . . . , β
]
n). Letting xi(0) = β
]
i , i ∈ V in instead, there still holds
lim
t→∞xi(t) =
n∑
j=1
βj/n, but βi has been kept as private information for node i.
[Network Linear Equations] For the network linear equation (4), the PPSC mechanism can provide
distributed solver with privacy guarantees.
Privacy Preserving Linear Equation Solver
1: Set t← 0 and y1(t), . . . , yn(t) ∈ Rr;
2: Run a PPSC algorithm with input y1(t), . . . , yn(t) and produce output y
]
1(t), . . . , y
]
n(t);
3: Run the averaging consensus algorithm with input y]1(t), . . . , y
]
n(t) and output the agreement y¯(t) at
each node i;
4: Each node i computes yi(t+ 1)← Pi(y¯(t)). Set t← t+ 1 and go to Step 2.
The above privacy preserving linear equation solver produces the following recursion:
yi(t+ 1) = Pi
( n∑
j=1
yj(t)
n
)
, t ∈ Z≥0, i ∈ V, (10)
which falls to the category of the projected consensus algorithms in [5]. According to Proposition 2 in [5],
each node state yi(t) converges to a solution of the linear equation (4) if it admits exact solutions, i.e.,
z ∈ span{H}.
[Distributed Gradient Descent] With the PPSC mechanism, the distributed gradient descent algo-
rithm (7) can also be made privacy-preserving, by the following procedure.
Privacy Preserving Distributed Optimizer
1: Set t← 0 and y1(t), . . . , yn(t) ∈ Rr;
2: Each node i computes y[i (t)← yi(t)− 1√t+1∇fi(yi(t));
3: Run a PPSC algorithm with input y[1(t), . . . , y
[
n(t) and produce output y
]
1(t), . . . , y
]
n(t);
4: Run the averaging consensus algorithm with input y]1(t), . . . , y
]
n(t) and output the agreement y¯(t) at
each node i;
5: Each node i sets yi(t+ 1)← y¯(t).
6: Set t← t+ 1 and go to Step 2.
The underlying dynamics of the privacy-preserving distributed optimizer is described by
yi(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
yj(t)
n
− 1√
t+ 1
n∑
j=1
∇fj(yj(t))
n
. (11)
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4.3 Privacy Preservation by PPSC
From the above three examples of integrating a PPSC step in each round of recursion of distributed
computing algorithms, we can see that the PPSC mechanism effectively achives the following advantages
in a distributed computing protocol:
(i) Nodes keep their real states xi(t) strictly from themselves, and receive only virtual states x
]
i(t)
produced by the PPSC mechanism P. The impossibility of identifying x(t) from x](t) = P(x(t))
(with even an arbitrary number of realizations of x](t) for each t) provides the nodes with plausible
deniability about their real states x(t) for all t, which immediately implies the same deniability
about the Di.
(ii) The price paid in the PPSC step is that averaging the x](t) = P(x(t)) may take more time than
averaging the x(t) over the same graph G. Since x]i(t) has proven privacy guarantee, there is no need
to share it with only neighbors for privacy concerns. Each node i can broadcast x]i(t) to the entire
network whenever possible, and therefore may compensate the efficiency lost in the averaging step.
(iii) The sum consistency property from PPSC mechanism guarantees that the computation produces
the same result with or without the PPSC privacy preservation steps in the above consensus-based
linear equation solving and gradient descent algorithms.
In Part II of the paper, we will show that conventional gossip algorithms can be used to realize PPSC
mechanism in distributed manners over a network by only a finite number of steps, and beyond non-
identifiability of the PPSC mechanism P, we can even easily ensure P to be differentially private.
We also acknowledge that a weakness of the above PPSC-based distributed computation is that it
involves running PPSC and average consensus to completion for every gradient step, which is likely to
be very slow over the network G and lead to truncation errors when we use only a finite number of
average consensus. However, since β] can be proven privacy preserving, each node i can broadcast βi to
the entire network for the average consensus, instead of communicating with neighbors in G only. As a
result, averaging β] can be much faster compared to averaging β over G, producing the same consensus
value. This would not resolve the effect of finite-step truncation errors, which is left to future work.
5 Local Dynamical Privacy
Finally, we turn our attention to local dynamics eavesdroppers, where two types of behaviors, passive or
active, are distinguished for the role of a local eavesdropper in the network dynamics.
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5.1 Local Dynamics Eavesdroppers
We introduce the following definition.
Definition 6. (i) A passive local dynamics eavesdroppers is a party adherent to one node i ∈ V and
therefore has access to the observations of {xj(t), j ∈ Ni}∞t=0.
(ii) An active local dynamics eavesdroppers is a party adherent to one node i ∈ V, has access to the
observations of {xj(t), j ∈ Ni}∞t=0, and can arbitrarily alter the dynamics of xi(t).
In either of the two cases in Definition 6, we assume without loss of generality that such a local
dynamics eavesdropper is precisely a node i ∈ V. From the perspectives of local eavesdroppers, recovering
information about the D from {xj(t), j ∈ Ni}∞t=0 defines a structured system identification problem. Let
Ni = {j1, . . . , j|Ni|} with j1 < · · · < j|Ni|. Define Ei ∈ R|Ni|×n as the matrix whose entries in the k–th row
are all zeros except for the kjk–th entry being one. Denote F = W ⊗ Im − α diag
(
H1H>1
H>1 H1
, . . . , HnH
>
n
H>nHn
)
.
Introduce
T =
{
T ∈ Rnm×nm : T is invertible, (Ei ⊗ Im)T = [Im|Ni| 0]
}
.
For the CPA (5) against passive local dynamics eavesdroppers, we can establish the following understand-
ing based on the result on obtaining the minimal realization of LTI systems from input–output data in
time domain established in [31].
Theorem 3. Consider the distributed linear equation solver CPA (5) for E ∈ E ∗[nm]. Assume that the
weight matrix W and the step size α are public knowledge. Suppose the following two conditions hold:
(i) (F,Ei ⊗ Im) is a completely observable pair; (ii) There exist t1 < · · · < tnm such that the vectors
x(tk), k = 1, . . . , nm are linearly independent. Then for the passive local dynamics eavesdropper i, it can
be determine from {xj(t), j ∈ Ni}∞t=0 a subset E † ⊂ E ∗[nm] such that E ∈ E †, where
E † =
{
Ay = b : diag
(
A1A
>
1
A>1 A1
, . . . ,
AnA
>
n
A>nAn
)
= (W ⊗ I−T−1F∗T)/α; b = A lim
t→∞xi(t); T ∈ T
}
.
Here F∗ ∈ Rnm×nm depends on {xj(t), j ∈ Ni}∞t=0 only.
For the CPA (5) against an active local eavesdropper i, we provide the following result based on the
time–domain–based system identification method proposed in [32].
Theorem 4. Consider the distributed linear equation solver CPA (5) for E ∈ E ∗[nm]. Assume that E admits
a unique solution y∗ ∈ Rm. Assume further that the weight matrix W, the step size α and the solution
y∗ are public knowledge. Then there is a simple strategy for an active local dynamics eavesdropper i by
adding a periodic signal r : Z≥0 → Rm to xi(t) at each time t under which it can identify E † ⊂ E ∗[nm] with
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E ∈ E †, given by
E † =
{
Ay = b : diag
(
A1A
>
1
A>1 A1
, . . . ,
AnA
>
n
A>nAn
)
= (W ⊗ I−T−1F∗T)/α; b = Ay∗; T ∈ T
}
,
T =
{
T ∈ Rnm×nm : T is invertible, (Ei ⊗ Im)T = C∗
}
.
Here F∗ ∈ Rnm×nm and C∗ ∈ R|Ni|m×nm depend on r(t) and {xj(t), j ∈ Ni}∞t=0 only.
From Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, a passiave or active eavesdropper eventually finds A∗ ∈ Rnm×nm and
C∗ ∈ R|Ni|m×nm such that ZH = diag
(
H1H>1
H>1 H1
, . . . , HnH
>
n
H>nHn
)
satisfies
(W ⊗ Im − αZH)T = TA∗,
(Ei ⊗ Im)T = C∗.
Introduce a new matrix variable Q = ZHT. Then solving Q and T from the above equations will lead to
the recovering of ZH , which further yilds E in the quotient space in view of the knowlege of y
∗. Then we
can establish by vectorization that S∗ −αIn2m2
Inm ⊗ (Ei ⊗ Im) 0

vec(T)
vec(Q)
 =
 0
vec(C∗)
 (12)
where S∗ = Inm ⊗ (W ⊗ Im)−A∗ ⊗ Inm. This linear equation about
(vec(T)>, vec(Q)>)>
is underdetermined, and therefore exploring the linear structure of the obtained equations is not enough
for the eavesdroppers to recover E. However, the Q and T have additional constraints: T must be non-
singular, and QT−1 has rank-one diagonal blocks. These highly nonlinear but strong constraint condtions
might eventually locate a unique solution from the solution set of (12).
5.2 Numerical Example
Example 4. Let the CPA (5) be implemented with the same setup in Example 1 on the graph in Figure
1 for solving a linear equation E : Hy = z with
H =

71.5 −65.5
−95 47.1
−35.5 100
86.5 −69
 , z =

−202.5
189.2
235.5
−224.5
 .
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Suppose a local eavesdropper is at node 2 and system identification methods in [31,32] have led to
A∗ =

0.86 1.09 −0.87 −0.73 0.47 0.05 0.61 −0.87
0.61 0.59 −0.47 −0.16 −0.36 −0.70 −0.61 0.20
0.78 1.10 −0.94 −1.06 0.06 −0.65 0.15 −0.75
1.03 0.64 −1.12 0.27 −0.28 −0.85 −0.68 0.09
−0.73 −1.37 1.72 1.18 0.30 0.38 −0.53 1.19
−1.22 −0.78 1.40 0.84 0.47 2.10 0.92 −0.01
2.03 1.60 −2.97 −1.82 −0.33 −1.94 0.03 −0.96
0.36 0.19 −0.35 −0.21 −0.12 −0.39 −0.30 0.80

,
C∗ =

−60.68 83.44 6.16 −67.56 37.84 7.67 63.46 −63.63
−49.78 −42.83 55.83 58.86 49.63 99.23 73.74 −47.24
23.21 51.44 86.80 −37.76 −9.89 −84.36 −83.11 −70.89
−5.34 50.75 −74.02 5.71 −83.24 −11.46 −20.04 −72.79
 .
Let the eavesdropper attempt to approximate ZH by the following optimization problem:
min
H∈Rn×m,T∈Rnm×nm
‖(W ⊗ Im − αZH)T−TA∗‖2F
s.t. (Ei ⊗ Im)T = C∗
ZH = diag
(
H1H
>
1
H>1 H1
, . . . ,
HnH
>
n
H>nHn
)
.
(13)
It turns out that the interior-points method leads to iterations converging to local minima in general.
However, when the initial estimate of the interior–point method is sufficiently close to the true H, the
interior–point method can find the value of H.
Figure 3: The log–log plot of ‖H¯k −H‖2F along the interior–point method starting from different initial
estimates H¯0. Here H¯k is the k–th iteration of the interior–point method implemented over the problem
(13).
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6 Conclusions
We have shown that distributed computing inevitably led to privacy risks in terms the local datasets by
both global and local eavesdroppers having access to the entirety of part of the node states. Such threats
deserves attention as much of the dynamical states in distributed computing protocols represents physical
states, which is sensitive in terms of both privacy to individuals and vulnerability to eavesdroppers. After
presenting a general frame work, we showed that for network linear equations, the computational privacy
has indeed been completely lost to global eavesdroppers for almost all initial values following existing
distributed linear equation solvers, and partially to local passive or active eavesdroppers who can monitor
or alter one selected node. We proposed a Privacy-Preserving-Summation-Consistent (PPSC) mechanism,
and showed that it can be used as a generic privacy encryption step for consensus-based distributed
computations. The central idea of using the consensus manifold as a place to hide node privacy while
achieving computation accuracy may be extended to non-consensus based distributed computing tasks in
future work.
Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Suppose there exist datasets D ′ 6= D that yield the same node state trajectory Mx0(D) = Mx0(D ′)
under x0. Due to the existence of D ′, D cannot be uniquely determined from Mx0(D), implying that
(1) is globally computationally private with respect to D under x0. On the other hand, we suppose that
Mx0(D) =Mx0(D ′) implies D = D ′. As a result,Mx0 is injective andM−1x0 exists. Then fromMx0(D), a
unique dataset D always be uniquely determined by M−1x0 . Therefore, (1) is not globally computationally
private with respect to D under x0.
(ii) Along (1) with randomized update, the observation sequence Mx0(D) becomes an array of random
variables, with its statistical properties fully characterized by its PDF. Define a mapping q from the space
of D to the space of pdf
(
Mx0(D)
)
. Then q(D) = q(D ′) if and only if D = D ′. Thus the proof of (ii) is
analogous to (i) and omitted here.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We first provide the following lemma that assists with the proof.
Lemma 1. Consider a linear equation E ∈ E ∗[nm] and an initial condition x0 ∈ Rnm.
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(i) Along the CPA (5), E is recoverable in the quotient space E ∗[nm]/ ∼ by a global dynamics eavesdropper
under x0 if and only if for each i ∈ V, either of the following conditions holds: (a) There exists si ∈ Z≥0
such that Pi
(
xi(si)
) 6= xi(si); (b) There exist ri1, . . . , rim ∈ Z≥0 such that xi(ri1), . . . ,xi(rim) are affinely
independent.
(ii) Along the the PCA (6), E is recoverable in the quotient space E ∗[nm]/ ∼ by a global dynamics
eavesdropper under x0 if and only if for each i ∈ V, either of the following conditions holds: (a) There
exists si ∈ Z≥0 such that
∑
j∈Ni
wijPi
(
xj(si)
) 6= ∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si); (b) There exist r
i
1, . . . , r
i
m ∈ Z≥0 such that∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(r
i
1), . . . ,
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(r
i
m) are affinely independent.
Proof. (i) (Necessity.) Suppose there exists i∗ ∈ V such that neither (a) nor (b) holds. Then Pi∗
(
xi∗(t)
)
=
xi∗(t) for all t ∈ Z≥0. As a result, the dynamics (5) becomes
xi∗(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni∗
wijxj(t);
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(t) + α
(
Pi
(
xi(t)
)− xi(t)), i 6= i∗.
This means that the trajectory of x(t) contains no information about Ei∗ , except for the knowledge
Pi∗
(
xi∗(t)
)
= xi∗(t). By the definition of Pi, the eavesdropper can only attempt to recover Ei∗ from
H>i∗xi∗(t) = zi∗ , t ∈ Z≥0. (14)
Since the eavesdropper does not know zi∗ , from the perspective of the eavesdropper who does not know
zi∗ , the infinite equation set (14) is equivalent to
H>i∗xi∗(0) = H
>
i∗xi∗(1) = · · · . (15)
It is clear that (15) is equivalent to the constraint that Hi∗ is perpendicular to xi∗(t) − xi∗(s) for all
t, s ∈ Z≥0. When (b) does not hold, the vectors xi∗(t) for all t ∈ Z≥0 are affinely dependent, which
yields [38] dim
{
xi∗(t) − xi∗(s) : ∀t, s ∈ Z≥0
}
< m − 1. This implies the solution space of Hi∗ satisfying
(15) has dimension larger than one. Therefore, Ei∗ , and there by E, is not recoverable. This implies that
the CPA (5) is computationally private.(
Sufficiency of Condition (a)
)
Suppose the condition (a) holds for any i ∈ V. Then according to (5), one
has
xi(si + 1) 6=
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si). (16)
Direct calculation shows Pi(x) =
(
Im − HiH
>
i
H>i Hi
)
x + ziHi
H>i Hi
. Based on the dynamics (5), we have
αHi
H>i Hi
(
zi −H>i xi(t)
)
= xi(t+ 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(t). (17)
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Clearly, (16) guarantees that both sides of (17) are nonzero when t = si, which further implies that Hi
and xi(t+ 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(t) are parallel nonzero vectors. Defining
Hˆi =
xi(si + 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si)∥∥∥∥xi(si + 1)− ∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si)
∥∥∥∥ , (18)
there exists λ 6= 0 such that
Hi = λHˆi. (19)
By replacing xi(t+ 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(t) and Hi in (17) based on the relations given in (18) and (19), one has
αHˆi ·
(
zi
λ
− Hˆ>i xi(si)
)
= Hˆi ·
∥∥∥∥xi(si + 1)−∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si)
∥∥∥∥. (20)
It can be observed that both sides of (20) are a product of a scalar and the nonzero vector Hˆi. Thus one
can obtain the following equation by letting the scalars at the left– and right–hand side be equal.
α
(
zi
λ
− Hˆ>i xi(si)
)
=
∥∥∥∥xi(si + 1)−∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si)
∥∥∥∥. (21)
By letting λ = 1 in (21), one can immediately recover the following linear equation.
Eˆi :
(
xi(si + 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si)
)>
y =
(
xi(si + 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si)
)>
xi(si)
+
1
α
∥∥∥∥xi(si + 1)−∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(si)
∥∥∥∥2.
(22)
It can be easily verified Eˆi ∼ Ei.(
Sufficiency of Condition (b)
)
Suppose the condition (b) holds for any i ∈ V. We have shown above the
linear equation E is recoverable if the condition (a) holds, and thus in this case we suppose the condition
(a) does not hold, namely Pi
(
xi(t)
)
= xi(t) for all t. By the definition of Pi, we know
H>i xi(r
i
k) = zi, k = 1, . . . ,m. (23)
Further, it follows from (23)
H>i
(
xi(r
i
k+1)− xi(rik)
)
= 0, k = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
which can be written into a compact form UHi = 0, where U is an m−1–by–m matrix with each row being
Uk = xi(r
i
k+1)−xi(rik), k = 1, . . . ,m− 1. According to [38], rank(U) = m− 1 and thereby the dimension
of the kernel of U is one. We can pick any H′i 6= 0 in the kernel of U and compute z′i = H′>i xi(rik) with
any k. Finally, E′i : H
′>
i y = z
′
i that is equivalent to Ei can be recovered.
We have shown above that if either the condition (a) or the condition (b) holds for any i, then E′i ∼ Ei
is recoverable.
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(ii) For all i ∈ V, there holds according to (6)
Hi
H>i Hi
(
zi −H>i
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(ti)
)
= xi(ti + 1)−
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(ti). (24)
It is worth noting that (24) along the PCA (6) is similar to (17) along the CPA (5). By the same arguments
as the proof for the CPA (5), we can establish the desired statement as well.
(i) Based on Lemma 1, we know if E is recoverable under x(0) along the CPA (5), then there exists i∗ ∈ V
such that neither the condition (a) nor the condition (b) holds. Correspondingly, we define sets
St =
{
x(0) ∈ Rnm : Pi
(
xi∗(t)
)
= xi∗(t), where xi∗(t) evolves according to (5)
}
, t ∈ Z≥0
T =
{
x(0) ∈ Rnm : xi∗(t), t ∈ Z≥0 are affinely dependent, where xi∗(t) evolves according to (5)
}
.
According to the claim above, x(0) ∈ ⋂∞t=0 St ⋂ T. Clearly, x(0) ∈ S0 says Hi∗H>
i∗Hi∗
(
zi∗ −H>i∗xi∗(0)
)
= 0.
Recall that Ei for all i are assumed to be nontrivial. Then the subspace S0 has dimension nm − 1, and
thus has measure zero in Rnm. Since
⋂∞
t=0 St
⋂
T is a subset of S0, it also has measure zero. This finishes
proving that the CPA (5) is not computationally private under almost all initial conditions.
(ii) Analogously, if E is recoverable under x(0) along the PCA (6), then based on Lemma 1, there necessarily
exists i∗ ∈ V such that
H>i∗
H>i∗Hi∗
∑
j∈Ni
wi∗jxj(0) = zi∗ ,
which restricts the dimension of the subspace of x(0) to nm− 1. This leads to the same conclusion as the
CPA (5).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
The DP–DLES can be written as
x[i(t) = PΩ
(
xi(t)
)
x]i(t) = x
[(t) + ωi(t)
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni
Wijx
]
j(t) + α(t)
(
Pi
(
x[i(t)
)− x[i(t)).
(25)
Define P ∗Ω
(
x(t)
)
= [PΩ
(
x1(t)
)>
. . . PΩ
(
xn(t)
)>
]> and ω(t) = [ω1(t)> . . . ωn(t)>]>. By removing the
intermediate states x[i(t) and x
]
i(t), we can rewrite (25) compactly as
x(t+ 1) =
(
W ⊗ Im
)(
x(t) + ω(t)
)
+ α(t)
(
zH − ZHP ∗Ω
(
x(t)
))
, (26)
where ZH = diag
(
H1H>1
H>1 H1
, . . . , HnH
>
n
H>nHn
)
, zH =
[
z1H1
H>1 H1
. . . znHn
H>nHn
]>
. We now associate each iteration of
DP–DLES at time t ∈ Z≥0 with a mechanism Mt : E ∗[nm]×Rnm → Rnm satisfying Mt
(
E,x(t)
)
= x(t+ 1).
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Consider two adjacent linear equations E : Hy = z,E′ = H′y = z′ ∈ E ∗[nm]. We define Z′H , z′H for E′
similarly as ZH , zH for E. Then for E,E
′, there holds
Pr
(
Mt(E,x(t)) = x(t+ 1)
)
Pr
(
Mt(E′,x(t)) = x(t+ 1)
)
a)
=
pdf
(
(W ⊗ Im)−1
(
x(t+ 1)−α(t)(zH − ZHP ∗Ω(x(t))))− x(t))
pdf
(
(W ⊗ Im)−1
(
x(t+ 1)−α(t)(z′H − Z′HP ∗Ω(x(t))))− x(t))
≤ exp
(
α(t)
cφt
∥∥(W ⊗ Im)−1((ZH − Z′H)P ∗Ω(x(t))− (zH − z′H))∥∥1)
≤ exp
(
α(t)
cφt
∥∥W−1 ⊗ Im∥∥1∥∥(ZH − Z′H)P ∗Ω(x(t))− (zH − z′H)∥∥1)
= exp
(
α(t)
cφt
∥∥W−1∥∥
1
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥(HiH>iH>i Hi − H
′
iH
′>
i
H′>i H
′
i
)
PΩ
(
xi(t)
)− ( ziHi
H>i Hi
− z
′
iH
′
i
H′>i H
′
i
)∥∥∥∥
1
)
b)
≤ exp
(
α(t)
√
nm
cφt
∥∥W−1∥∥ n∑
i=1
(∥∥∥∥HiH>iH>i Hi − H
′
iH
′>
i
H′>i H
′
i
∥∥∥∥∥∥PΩ(xi(t))∥∥+ ∥∥∥∥ ziHiH>i Hi − z
′
iH
′
i
H′>i H
′
i
∥∥∥∥))
c≤ exp
(
λψt
√
nm
cφtσm(W)
(
BδH + δz
))
, (27)
where a) uses (26) and the PDF of Laplace random variables, b) is obtained from norm inequalities, and c)
comes from the linear–equation adjacency. By omitting the notation E, the following composition relation
holds M = (M0,M1 ◦M0, . . . , · · · ◦M1 ◦M0). To let M be
(
, δH, δz
)
–differentially private, based on
(27), the following must hold from the composition property of differential privacy (see, e.g., Theorem 1
of [37]):
∞∑
t=0
λψt
√
nm
cφtσm(W)
(
BδH + δz
) ≤ ,
which further implies the desired result.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1. The CPA (5) can be compactly rewritten as
x(t+ 1) = Fx(t) + αzH, (28)
where F = W ⊗ Im − α diag
(
H1H>1
H>1 H1
, . . . , HnH
>
n
H>nHn
)
and z>H =
[
z1H>1
H>1 H1
. . . znH
>
n
H>nHn
]
. Any passive local
dynamics eavesdropper i ∈ V knows a solution y∗ to the linear equation E as a result of implementing the
CPA (5). By introducing γ(t) = x(t)− 1⊗ y∗, the eavesdropper can rewrite (28) into
γ(t+ 1) = Fγ(t). (29)
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Since the eavesdropper i has access to only the state observations of the nodes in Ni, its observation can
be described by
v(t) = (Ei ⊗ Im)γ(t) + 1⊗ y∗.
Alternatively, knowing y∗, this passive eavesdropper has access to
y(t) = v(t)− 1⊗ y∗ = (Ei ⊗ Im)γ(t). (30)
Step 2. We apply the system identification approach from [31] to the system described by (29)–(30) with
state γ(t) and output y(t). According to [31], if (F,E⊗ Im) is completely observable, i.e., the matrix
O =

Ei ⊗ Im
(Ei ⊗ Im)F
...
(Ei ⊗ Im)Fnm−|Ni|m

has full column rank, and there exist t1 < · · · < tnm such that the vectors x(tk), k = 1, . . . , nm are linearly
independent, then the passive local dynamics eavesdropper i can identify (F∗,C∗) ∈ Rnm×nm×R|Ni|m×nm
from
(
y(t)
)∞
t=0
by the following procedure.
(i) Collect a number of consecutive outputs of the system (29)–(30)
(
y(t)
)tk+nm−|Ni|m
t=tk
for k = 1, . . . , nm
and construct
Y =

y(t1) · · · y(tnm)
...
. . .
...
y(t1 + nm− |Ni|m− 1) · · · y(tnm + nm− |Ni|m− 1)
 ,
Y =

y(t1 + 1) · · · y(tnm + 1)
...
. . .
...
y(t1 + nm− |Ni|m) · · · y(tnm + nm− |Ni|m)
 .
Since Y = O[x(t1) · · · x(tnm)] and O has full column rank, rank(Y ) = rank[x(t1) · · · x(tnm)] = nm.
(ii) Write the state–output relation for the collected output data as
Y = O(W ⊗ Im − αZH)
[
x(t1) · · · x(tnm)
]
,
Y = O
[
x(t1) · · · x(tnm)
]
.
(31)
(iii) Choose a row–selecting matrix S : Rnm×|Ni|(nm−|Ni|m) such that SY is invertible, and further, based
on (31), obtains F∗ := SO(W ⊗ Im − αZH)(SO)−1 = SY(SY)−1 and then C∗ = [Im|Ni| 0].
The obtained pair (A∗,C∗) is different from (F,Ei⊗ Im) subject to a coordinate change based on Propo-
sition 2.3 of [39]:
T−1FT = F∗, (Ei ⊗ Im)T = C∗ (32)
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with an invertible T ∈ Rnm×nm.
Step 3. We now come back to the point of view of the eavesdropper. Since the local dynamics eavesdropper
i knows Ei, it can determine the set T based on (32). By (32), there exists some T ∈ T such that
diag
(
H1H>1
H>1 H1
, . . . , HnH
>
n
H>nHn
)
= (W⊗ I−T−1F∗T)/α. It is worth noting that the eavesdropper can compute
z = H lim
t→∞xi(t). This completes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
We first establish a lemma that assists with the presentation of the privacy of CPA (5) against the active
local eavesdropper i.
Lemma 2. The eigenvalues of W ⊗ Im − αZH for α ∈
(
0, λm(W) + 1
)
are all strictly less than one in
absolute value if E ∈ E ∗[nm] has a unique solution.
Proof. By the randomness of W and Lemma 8.1.21 [40], for any v = [v>1 . . . v>n ]> 6= 0 with vi ∈ Rm,
there holds λm(W)‖v‖2 ≤ v>(W ⊗ Im)v ≤ ‖v‖2, where the right–hand equality holds if and only if
v1 = · · · = vn. In addition, 0 ≤ v>ZHv =
n∑
i=1
‖H>i vi‖2
H>i Hi
≤ ‖v‖2 for all v, where the left–hand equality holds
if and only if each vi is perpendicular to Hi. Then it can be concluded that
(
λm(W)−α
)‖v‖2 ≤ v>(W⊗
Im − αZH)v ≤ ‖v‖2 for all v, where the right–hand equality holds if and only if v1 = · · · = vn ∈ ker(H).
Since α < λm(W) + 1 and ker(H) = ∅, −‖v‖2 < v>(W ⊗ Im − αZH)v < ‖v‖2, implying that all its
eigenvalues fall in (−1, 1).
Again we divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1. Let a T -periodic signal r : Z≥0 → Rm be added to xi(t) at each time t by the eavesdropper i with
T ≥ 2nm+ 1 and
R =

r(0) r(1) · · · r(T − 1)
r(T − 1) r(0) · · · r(T − 2)
...
...
. . .
...
r(1) r(2) · · · r(0)

having full rank. Now the system (29) becomes
γ(t+ 1) = Fγ(t) + Br(t), t > t∗, (33)
where B ∈ Rnm is the Kronecker product of an all–zeros vector except for the i–the component being one
and the m–by–m identity matrix. From Lemma 2, F is a stable matrix if E has a unique solution.
Step 2. We apply the system identification approach from [32] to the system (30)–(33) with state γ(t) and
output y(t) by the following procedure:
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(i) Collect
(
y(t)
)kT+T−1
t=kT
for some large k, namely consecutive outputs of the system (30)–(33) within
one period T .
(ii) Compute
∞∑
j=0
[
GjT . . . GjT+T−1
]
=
[
y(kT ) . . . y(kT + T − 1)
]
·R−1,
where Gj = (Ei ⊗ Im)(W ⊗ Im − αZH)j−1b and G0 = 0 are the impulse responses of the system
(30)–(33). The result is finite because the system (33) is stable by Lemma 2.
(iii) Reorganize
∞∑
j=0
GjT+l with l = 0, . . . , T − 1 in a Hankel matrix M ∈ Rp×q
M =

∞∑
j=0
GjT+1 · · ·
∞∑
j=0
GjT+q
...
. . .
...
∞∑
j=0
GjT+p · · ·
∞∑
j=0
GjT+p+q−1

with p > nm, p+ q = T and computes its singular value decomposition as
M =
[
Us Uo
]Σs 0
0 Σo
V>s
V>o
 , Σs ∈ Rnm×nm.
Then A∗ = ([I|Ni|m(p−1) 0]Us)
+[0 I|Ni|m(p−1)]Us and C∗ = [I|Ni|m 0]Us, where T
−1(W ⊗ Im −
αZH)T = A∗, (Ei ⊗ Im)T = C∗ and T ∈ Rnm×nm is invertible.
According to Theorem 1 in [32], with F being stable, the obtained pair (F∗,C∗) and (F,C) also satisfy
the relation in (32).
Step 3. From (32), the eavesdropper can determine the set T. By (32), there exists some T ∈ T such that
diag
(
H1H>1
H>1 H1
, . . . , HnH
>
n
H>nHn
)
= (W⊗I−T−1F∗T)/α. Further, the eavesdropper can compute z = Hy∗. This
completes the proof.
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